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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

BANKRUPTCY: PRE-PETITION ACCELERATION OF MORTGAGE DEBT ON
PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE-ARREARAGES MAY BE CURED UNDER CHAPTER
13 PLAN AND ORIGINAL PAYMENT SCHEDULE REINSTATED. Grubbs v.

Houston FirstAmerican Savings Association, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984)
(en banc).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Grubbs
that a Chapter 13 debtor may propose a payment plan to cure an accelerated pre-petition mortgage default on his principal residence, even after
initiation of state foreclosure proceedings. The decision is significant because it allows a Chapter 13 debtor to: (1) cure arrearages accumulated by
a default on his home mortgage during the life of his bankruptcy plan, and
(2) reinstate the original installment payment terms despite the acceleration of that debt which would otherwise require immediate and full
payment.
Houston First American Savings Association [Houston First], in April
1979, made a three year mortgage loan to Grubbs in return for a promissory note and a deed of trust secured by Grubbs' principal residence. The
loan constituted a second mortgage. Following several months of nonpayment, Houston First exercised its option under the note, accelerated the
debt, and demanded payment in full. In June 1981, foreclosure proceedings were initiated in state court. The following month, Grubbs filed a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, thereby staying foreclosure. In February 1982,
Grubbs amended his bankruptcy payment plan by proposing that the delinquent amounts be paid during the thirty-six month plan and that the
original terms of the mortgage be reinstated. Houston First objected to the
proposal, and the bankruptcy court sustained that objection. The district
court and a summary court of the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit, en banc, however, reversed, holding that Grubbs may cure his default
of the monthly payments during the life of the plan and remanded for
further consideration of the proposal and objections thereto.
Under section 1322(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)),
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the debtor is generally permitted to cure or waive any default. Section
1322(b)(5) allows cure of long-term debts within a reasonable time on any
unsecured or secured claim "on which the last payment is due after the
date on which the final payment under the plan is due." Section
1322(b)(5) is limited by section 1322(b)(2), which states that claims secured
only by an interest in the debtor's principal residence cannot be modified
by a Chapter 13 plan.
In an extensive analysis of the legislative histories of these statutes,
Judge Take, writing for the majority, determined that the purpose of
Chapter 13 is to enable a debtor to repay his debts over an extended period
of time without full liquidation of his assets. Additionally, the majority
held that the power to cure provided by the statutes necessarily comprehends the power to de-accelerate the note in order to make payment upon
it. The court concluded that even though the mortgage debt was otherwise
due in full upon acceleration, cure of the arrearages was allowed under
section 1322(b)(3), and such cure complied with section 1322(b)(2) in that
the creditor's rights were not modified.
The Grubbs majority relied strongly on a recent decision from the Second Circuit, In re Taddeo. Under identical facts and circumstances, the
Taddeo court held that to preserve the goals and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 13 debtor could cure his mortgage default on his
principal residence under section 1322(b)(3) by de-accelerating the debt
and reinstating the original payment terms under section 1322(b)(5). See
In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1982). As did the mortgagee in
Taddeo, Houston First contended that the cure under section 1322(b)(5)
was applicable only to non-accelerated debts, since state law made the entire accelerated debt immediately due and payable in full. See General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Uresti, 553 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); In re Williams, 11 Bankr. 504, 506 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1981). The Fifth Circuit followed Taddeo's reasoning and held
that federal law determines the payment schedule on a pre-petition accelerated mortgage. See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d
236, 242 (5th Cir. 1984). For other decisions supporting this aspect of
Grubbs, see In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1984) (to apply
§ 1322(b)(5) look to date of last payment under note, rather than due date
after acceleration); In reAllen, 42 Bankr. 360, 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(§ 1322(b)(5) refers to date on face of mortgage); In re Stokes, 39 Bankr.
336, 341 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) ("last payment" in § 1322 (b)(5) means
when it would have been due but for acceleration).
But see In re McCann, 27 Bankr. 678, 679 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (accelerated debt eliminates § 1322(b)(5) cure option); In re Soderlund, 18
Bankr. 12, 16 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (since accelerated note due immediately, § 1322(b)(5) cure unavailable); In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937, 944
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(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (defaulted note becomes demand note on
acceleration).
Courts have generally allowed debtors to cure their accelerated mortgages through a Chapter 13 proposal during different stages of foreclosure
proceedings. Both the Grubbs and Taddeo decisions allow the debtor to
cure his default prior to the entry of a state foreclosure judgment. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals extended these holdings in allowing cure
even though a Wisconsin state court had entered a foreclosure judgment
prior to the debtor's filing for bankruptcy. See In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869,
870, 874 (7th Cir. 1984). For other cases permitting cure subsequent to a
foreclosure judgment but prior to sale, see In re Gwinn, 34 Bankr. 936, 945
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (cure provisions allow reinstitution of accelerated
mortgage even though brought to judgment); In re Tuchman, 29 Bankr. 39,
40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (mortgage debt may be de-accelerated even
though foreclosed under state law); In re Acevedo, 26 Bankr. 994, 997
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (debtor may cure and reinstate original payment
schedule prior to actual sale); In re Hardin, 16 Bankr. 810, 810, 812-13
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (debtor has right to reinstate installment plan
prior to foreclosure sale).
But see In re Stokes, 39 Bankr. 336, 343 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (undue
hardship on third party's rights if cure allowed after foreclosure); In re
Britton, 35 Bankr. 373, 376 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982) (debtor's plan cannot
reinstate arrearages following foreclosure); In re Maiorino, 15 Bankr. 254,
257-58 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (default converted into strict foreclosure
may not be cured); In re Land, 14 Bankr. 132, 134 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981) (following foreclosure, payment in full necessary during life of plan);
In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189, 195 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (permitting
debtor to reinstate following foreclosure judgment would seriously affect
home mortgages; not allowed).
For cases in which the default may be cured after a foreclosure sale, see
In re LaCrue, 33 Bankr. 569, 570, 572 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (following
sale, payment of arrearages during plan and deed of trust installments
outside of plan approved); In re Ivory, 32 Bankr. 788, 791 (Bankr. D. Or.
1983) (right of redemption allows debtor to retain interest in sold property
thus giving right to effect cure); In re Chambers, 27 Bankr. 687, 688-89
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (debtor still has property rights since no divestment of title); In re Taylor, 21 Bankr. 179, 181 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982)
(Bankruptcy Code establishes own right of redemption "in lieu of state
law"); In re Thompson, 17 Bankr. 748, 751 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982) (arrearages may be cured and terms reinstated if redemption period has not
run).
But see In re Rutterbush, 34 Bankr. 101, 103 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982)
(redemption period not stayed when petition filed; default not curable); In
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re Jenkins, 14 Bankr. 748, 749-50 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) (following sale,
mortgage merges into judgment); In re Butchman, 4 Bankr. 379, 380
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (under state law, after valid foreclosure and sale
no right of redemption remains); In re Robertson, 4 Bankr. 213, 216
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (at filing, debtors had only right of redemption, not
right to cure default).
Laura Ann Frase
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